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ABSTRACT
In the realm of American jurisprudence, little draws more
excitement or controversy than investigating the role of federal
judges in our constitutional order. Yet, at the same time, the
scholarly literature has not settled upon a singular descriptive
device to explain how federal judges actually carry out this
role. In broad strokes, current academic commentary appears
to be divided on the issue of whether fidelity to the law or fidelity to political ideology largely determines how judges decide
cases. This division, however interesting it may be, should not
be afforded the luxury of being examined on a level playing
field. Given the fact that the federal judiciary’s existence, as a
matter of first principles, is usually justified by its unique ability to be guided by legal principle over popular pressure, those
who subscribe to the political view of judging should have the
burden of persuasion. The object of this article, then, is to render that burden a bit more onerous by offering a novel method
for thinking about how legal doctrine constrains judges in deciding cases.
This novel method takes the form of a hypothesis and posits that the precise rhetorical form of the standard of review
impacts how judges import non-legal sources into their opinions. That is, I contend that the standard of review, through
its rhetorical posture, serves as an institutional boundary that
depicts how far the law is willing to go to recognize the reality
of other disciplines by using, or avoiding, vocabulary that is
readily accessible by these disciplines. In sum, legal vocabulary matters, and it matters because it grants discursive permission, or not, for judicial consideration of a specific type of
non-legal source in coming to a legal conclusion.
I. INTRODUCTION
Explaining how judges decide hard cases, esteemed scholar
and jurist Richard Posner has forthrightly stated that the Supreme Court “is in fact a political court.”1 Over time, a vast
1 RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 41 (2008). I recognize that
Posner uses the term “political” in a very precise sense. In that regard, I use
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scholarly literature2 has emerged suggesting that judicial application of legal doctrine is informed to a great extent by political preferences. At first blush, this seems to be an appealing
line of argument for it gives due consideration to Holmes’s notion that judges have an affirmative duty to grapple with the
pragmatic consequences of their decisions (at least in common
law adjudication).3 Given the institutional justifications for the
Court’s existence, however, we must be extremely careful to
avoid the conclusion that law is politics. Taking Alexander
Hamilton seriously in The Federalist No. 78,4 the judicial
branch garners institutional legitimacy, in part, precisely because of its non-political nature. Indeed, Hamilton writes that
the “independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard
the Constitution and the rights of individuals.”5 As a means of
ensuring that this independence is put to meritorious ends,
Hamilton envisioned a judiciary bound by legal rules and precedent.6 In the vein of Hamilton’s political theory, another body
of legal scholarship has developed7 to emphasize the role that
his statement only as an instructive tool. Moreover, Posner himself would
not subscribe to the view that doctrine never matters. However, Posner does
seem to think that the Supreme Court, especially when deciding constitutional cases, “is largely a political court.” Id. at 8.
2 Although I go into some detail about the literature in Part II, I give a
brief flavor of it here. For a work of political science that serves as a common
citation in this field, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (1993) (asserting that the justices’ political ideologies play an instrumental role in deciding cases). Numerous articles
in the legal academy further suggest that politics is intertwined with judicial
decisionmaking. See also Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal
Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155 (1998) (arguing that partisanship influences when a court will defer to an agency); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1719
(1997) (arguing that ideology “significantly influences judicial decisionmaking
on the D.C. Circuit,” especially when a judge’s vote is examined in light of the
political composition of the panel).
3 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV.
457, 467 (1897) (writing that judges have “failed adequately to recognize their
duty of weighing considerations of social advantage.”).
4 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
5 Id. at 392 (emphasis added).
6 See id. at 394.
7 To parallel footnote 2, some representative works of this scholarship are
presented at this stage. For a theoretical analysis of how legal doctrine

374

PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION

[Vol. 3::11

legal doctrine plays in judicial decisionmaking and to dispel
any claim that Posner’s observation exhaustively captures how
judges, for lack of a better word, “judge.”
The overall thrust of this article resides with the Hamiltonians. The contribution of this article lies in its ability to provide a new way for thinking about why doctrine might matter
in judicial decisionmaking and thus fashion another analytical
weapon, albeit a modest one, to combat wholesale allegiance to
Posner’s claim. More specifically, this article creates a hypothesis that aims to explain why the formality of judicial scrutiny
matters in light of judicial consideration of non-legal sources.8
The hypothesis suggests that a formalized standard of review
that uses technical legal vocabulary, as current equal protection scrutiny does, constrains judges in importing social science
sources into their legal analysis at the outset. This constraint
occurs because the formalized standard of review’s “code
words,”9 words such as “compelling purpose” and “narrowly tailored,” can only be defined by more legal doctrine which, in
turn, generates additional legal rhetoric that the social science
literature must internalize if that literature harbors any ambition of entering the court’s opinion. To put it differently, a
standard of review grounded in technical legalese conceals a
discursive link between the primary legal issue and applicable
social science sources until such a link is rendered intelligible
through the explication of additional legal doctrine. This addiguides judicial decisionmaking, see Frederick Schauer, Does Doctrine Matter?, 82 MICH. L. REV. 655 (1984). For empirical counterparts, see Michael A.
Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law
and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102 AM. POL. SCI REV. 369,
371 (2008) (finding that legal principles influence the decisions of Supreme
Court justices); Ward Farnsworth, The Role of Law in Close Cases: Some Evidence From the Federal Courts of Appeals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1083, 1095 (2006)
(agreeing that the expression of policy preferences may be precluded by the
relevant text or precedent in routine cases where the controlling law is clear).
8 See Richard A. Posner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE L.J. 1177, 1179 (2010) (arguing that novel
cases cannot be decided solely upon “the orthodox legal materials of text and
precedent”).
9 I borrow this word from Siegel. See Andrew M. Siegel, Equal Protection
Unmodified: Justice John Paul Stevens and the Case for Unmediated Constitutional Interpretation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2339, 2344 (2006) (maintaining
that judges use these “code words” to sort out the easy cases from the hard
ones).

2013]

LEGAL RHETORIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

375

tional doctrine, though perhaps essential to the forging of an
alliance between law and other disciplines, reveals itself to be a
judicial constraint because it creates an institutional boundary
depicting how far the law is willing to go to accommodate the
reality of other disciplines.10 The precise rhetorical form of the
standard of review, by calling forth additional legal doctrine
commensurate with this rhetorical form’s technicality, determines where that boundary falls.11
In order to put the hypothesis to work and show how it can
be applied to a particular area of jurisprudence, I focus on two
distinct forms of equal protection scrutiny. The first and most
familiar form, deemed tiered scrutiny, employs different levels
of judicial scrutiny depending on the precise governmental
classification at hand.12 The second and probably less familiar
form, revolving around Professor Andrew Siegel’s interpretation of Justice Stevens’s approach to the Equal Protection
Clause, asks judges to grapple with the words of the Constitution directly and without the use of mediating doctrine.13 As
Professor Ryan has noted, “social science evidence can influence the outcome of a court decision if the relevant legal standards allow some consideration of such evidence.”14 The object
of the hypothesis in this article, then, is to provide a method for
understanding how this dynamic takes hold given these two
forms of equal protection scrutiny.
To explore this dynamic in detail, this article undertakes a
case study of racial classifications in lower education by comparing how the articulation of scrutiny, or lack thereof, affected
One wonders whether this is a particular manifestation of the claim
that courts “develop a form of reasoning (through doctrine) that is internal to
itself and assertive of a particular kind of power.” Victoria Nourse & Gregory
Shaffer, Varieties of New Legal Realism: Can a New World Order Prompt a
New Legal Theory?, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 61, 123 (2009).
11 Professor Schauer has also recognized that the law does not absorb the
entire content of other disciplines. See Frederick Schauer, The Limited Domain of the Law, 90 VA. L. REV. 1909, 1914-15 (2004).
12 See Note, Justice Stevens’ Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV.
L. REV. 1146, 1150 (1987).
13 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2340.
14 James E. Ryan, The Limited Influence of Social Science Evidence in
Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L. REV. 1659, 1678 (2003) (emphasis
added).
10
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judicial consideration of social science data in the Supreme
Court cases of Brown v. Board of Education15 and Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1.16
This study comes in two parts. First, as a baseline for comparison, I argue that the articulation of scrutiny significantly
changes as we move from Brown to Parents Involved. That is,
while Brown can plausibly be read as involving “the unmediated application of judicial judgment to the constitutional text,”17
Chief Justice Roberts’s plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s
concurrence in Parents Involved applied traditional strict scrutiny analysis.18 Second, I contend that the verbal presentation
of scrutiny played a role in influencing the choice of social science sources that the justices used to address the harms of racial segregation.19 On the one hand, Brown’s reluctance to articulate any formally cognizable standard of review20 allowed
the Court to consult various sources depicting the harms of
segregation without filtering those sources through any additional doctrine above and beyond the standard of review. On
the other hand, the articulation of strict scrutiny in Roberts
and Thomas’s opinions in Parents Involved prompted these two
Justices to define the racial harm that the school districts could
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701
(2007).
17 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2342; see JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 157 (2011) (writing that,
“Brown v. Board of Education does not use the language of scrutiny”); Johnny
C. Parker, Equal Protection Minus Strict Scrutiny Plus Benign Classification
Equals What? Equality of Opportunity, 11 PACE L. REV. 213, 227 (1991) (stating that Brown did not employ the traditional strict scrutiny test).
18 See Nicole Love, Note, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1: The Application of Strict Scrutiny to Race-Conscious
Student Assignment Policies in K-12 Public Schools, 29 B.C. THIRD WORLD
L.J. 115, 132 (2009).
19 The Brown opinion dropped a footnote citing support for the notion
that black students were psychologically harmed by segregation. See Michael
Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and Multidisciplinarity, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 279, 293 (2005). Mirroring Brown, Parents Involved also
considered data that focused, in part, on the harms attending racially segregated schools. See Erica Frankenberg & Liliana Garces, The Use of Social
Science Evidence in Parents Involved and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 703, 717 (2007-2008).
20 See Frank T. Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration
Since Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 7, 9 (1975).
15
16
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remedy in terms of de jure and de facto segregation.21 Since
the social science literature itself does not make this distinction,22 the two Justices’ adoption of the de jure/de facto construct served to filter the types of social science sources that
they found relevant to their opinions. As we will further see,
Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved provides a wrinkle
to this analysis.
The blueprint of the article is as follows. In Part II, I lay
the foundations for the hypothesis. I first provide broader context to the law/politics debate in judicial decisionmaking by exploring the theoretical and empirical underpinnings of each
side. I then provide an overview of the doctrine that the hypothesis will work with to enter that debate, which comes in
the form of equal protection scrutiny and the Brown and Parents Involved decisions. In Part III, I describe the hypothesis
in detail and begin to substantiate it with a somewhat in-depth
case study. The case study observes the interplay between the
type of scrutiny applied and the types of social science sources
consulted in Brown and Parents Involved. Should this article
prove to be convincing in any way, Part IV concludes with a respectful challenge to scholars to corroborate my article on a
larger scale.
A word of warning. Explaining the relationship between
law and social science with any sort of precision is an incredibly difficult endeavor for, as Kafka presciently recognized, the
world of law can sometimes be unto itself.23 For what it is
worth, the hypothesis I put forth is meant only to stir thought;
like most things academic, it does not embody anything conclusive or authoritative.
II. LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE HYPOTHESIS: WHY IT
See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 710 (stating that this
threshold question determined how the justices approached the social science
data); see also Ansley T. Erickson, The Rhetoric of Choice: Segregation, Desegregation, and Charter Schools, DISSENT, Fall 2011, at 41, 42 (arguing that
both the plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurrence used the de jure/de facto distinction to define the harms that could be remedied).
22 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 712.
23 FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL 6 (1937) (using the character of Joseph K. to
question the visibility of law to the layperson).
21
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MATTERS AND THE DOCTRINE IT WILL WORK WITH
A. Why it Matters: The Law/Politics Divide in
Understanding How Judges Decide Cases
The hypothesis is embedded in a broader project to understand precisely how judges decide cases. As briefly stated in
the introduction, the structure of judicial decisionmaking has
been embroiled in a debate over whether politics or legal doctrine largely controls how judges behave. Furthering this debate in an intelligent manner holds fundamental importance
for both the general public and academics in two ways. First,
this debate serves as a practical tool for structuring how we
talk about the judicial branch.24 In a recent article examining
public perceptions of judicial decisionmaking, James Gibson
and Gregory Caldeira assert that, “[t]he American people know
that the justices of the Supreme Court exercise discretion in
making their decisions.”25 Thus, gaining a better understanding of what processes constitute this “discretion” will help us
speak more accurately about what judges do. Second, there
appears to be a subtle disconnect between the institutional legitimacy of the Supreme Court in theory and the legitimacy of
the Court in the eyes of the public. In the realm of theory, a
principal justification for the existence of the judicial branch is
that judges are to be disciplined by legal principles in adjudicating cases.26 Yet, Gibson and Caldeira have found that the
American people both believe that judges are influenced by ideology and base the legitimacy of the Court on the justices’ ability to apply that ideology in a principled manner.27 It would
24 See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 179,
180 (1986) (describing the concepts of “legal formalism” and “legal realism” as
playing a prominent role in legal thought).
25 James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged
the Legitimacy of the U.S. Supreme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 195, 213
(2011).
26 See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE LAW 25 (1997) (writing that, “[t]he rule of law is about form . . . Long
live formalism. It is what makes a government a government of laws and not
of men.”); Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1, 15 (1959) (contending that the main component of
judicial decisionmaking is a “genuinely principled” analysis).
27 See Gibson & Caldeira, supra note 25, at 214.

2013]

LEGAL RHETORIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

379

seem, then, that attempting to align the theoretical justifications for the Court’s work with that work’s current popular
perception is a laudable goal. If this is correct, and I think it is,
gaining a firmer grasp on the debate between law and politics
in judicial decisionmaking might allow for that alignment to
occur.
i.

Political Explanations for Judicial Decisionmaking

Structuring an argument that contends that the political
leanings of judges influence judicial decisionmaking might
begin with an appreciation of the school of thought known as
legal realism. In general, legal realists were primarily concerned with understanding how judges actually reason through
cases.28 That is, if, as Holmes says, law is “the prophecies of
what the courts will do in fact,”29 the realists aimed to uncover
the types of sources and reasoning that lawyers should consider if they want to take part in this prophetic exercise. A mainstay of legal realism was its proclamation that analytical reasoning relying solely upon legal doctrine has limited value in
explaining how courts operate.30 This is so, the realists maintained, because legal doctrine, such as interpreting common
law precedents and employing tools of statutory construction, is
inherently self-contradictory.31 Taking up this contention, Karl
Llewellyn famously proposed that there are opposing canons of
statutory construction applicable for every point of argumentation.32 Thus, the realists argued that cases are determined
with reference to factors other than legal rules.33 For example,
a majority of realists recognized the particular personality of
the judge as a significant motivating force in the crafting of juAMERICAN LEGAL REALISM 164 (William W. Fisher III et. al. eds., 1993).
Holmes, supra note 3, at 460-61.
30 See AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 28, at 164.
31 See id. at 165.
32 See Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision
and The Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395, 401-06 (1950) (presenting a table of the opposing canons of statutory construction).
33 See Joseph William Singer, Legal Realism Now, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 465,
474 (1988) (stating that, for the realists, law is based on considerations outside formal logic, such as human experience and policy).
28
29
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dicial opinions.34
Exploiting the realist position, some scholars have emphasized that legal doctrine services, rather than constrains, the
justices’ political persuasions. A prominent work in this regard
is that of Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth, which asserts that
the outcomes of Supreme Court cases are heavily influenced by
the justices’ political attitudes.35 Attacking the view that precedent constrains the justices’ political preferences, Segal and
Spaeth claim that precedent serves to merely rationalize a preordained outcome.36 Mirroring Segal and Spaeth’s discussion
of stare decisis, Julie Margetta Morgan and Diana Pullin attest
that the use of social science data in legal analysis has been
thought to justify a judicial determination only after the fact.37
In addition, other scholars have taken a more empirical
approach to establish that judicial decisionmaking is substantially influenced by ideology, psychology, and politics. To illustrate, Frank Cross and Emerson Tiller conclude that a court’s
willingness to defer to agency policy is guided by the alignment
of that policy with the political outlook of the court.38 Cross
and Tiller suggest that the political component of agency deference has caused minority judges to point out the majority’s abdication of legal doctrine to higher courts.39 Other studies by
law professors outside of the administrative law context further
support the idea that politics greatly determines legal outcomes.40
Giving due consideration to this field of scholarship, it does
not seem unreasonable to suggest that politics plays but one
role in judicial decisionmaking. At this point, it may be a foregone conclusion. What proves to be disturbing to readers wishSee AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 28, at 165.
See generally SEGAL & SPAETH, supra note 2.
36 See id. at 66.
37 See Julie Margetta Morgan & Diana Pullin, Social Science and the
Courts: Challenges and Strategies for Bridging Gaps Between Law and Research, 39 EDUC. RESEARCHER 515, 517 (2010).
38 See Cross & Tiller, supra note 2, at 2169.
39 See id. at 2173.
40 See Revesz, supra note 2, at 1719; see also Gregory C. Sisk & Michael
Heise, Judges and Ideology: Public and Academic Debates About Statistical
Measures, 99 N.W. U. L. REV. 743, 746 (2005) (finding that ideology influences
how lower federal courts adjudicate religious freedom cases).
34
35
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ing to see the judicial branch approximate something like Alexander Hamilton’s outlook, however, is the suggestion that
politics plays an exhaustive and absolute role in determining
how judges decide cases.41 Fortunately for these readers (and
myself), a distinct body of scholarly literature exists to ensure
that this suggestion does not morph into an incontrovertible
given. It is to this literature that we now turn.
ii. Legal Explanations for Judicial Decisionmaking
On February 14, 1989, Justice Scalia gave the Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. Lecture at Harvard University.42 In that
speech-turned-essay, Scalia argues, “[t]hat the Rule of law, the
law of rules, be extended as far as the nature of the question allows.”43 If that is Scalia’s ultimate thesis, he arrives at it
through two crucial statements. First, he writes, “that we
should recognize that, at the point where an appellate judge
says that the remaining issue must be decided on the basis of
the totality of the circumstances . . . he begins to resemble a
finder of fact more than a determiner of law.”44 Almost immediately after this sentence, Scalia states that if judges employ
“totality of the circumstances” tests when they are not absolutely necessary, “predictability is destroyed; judicial arbitrariness is facilitated; judicial courage is impaired.”45 In order to
resurrect this “judicial courage,” scholars have discerned two
constraining roles for legal doctrine in determining cases.
The first constraining role for doctrine is theoretical. In
simple terms, doctrine is the language of judicial reasoning and
supplies a vocabulary for judges to converse with other judges
This is not, I think, a straw-man argument. Consider the backdrop
against which these scholars are writing. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 1
(prefacing his argument with the proposition that, “[i]f changing judges
changes law, it is not even clear what law is.”); Schauer, supra note 7, at 656
(responding to the thesis that, “doctrine does not matter and that a change in
personnel on the Court will produce decisions unfettered by the developed
principles of previous courts.”).
42 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175 (1989).
43 Id. at 1187.
44 Id. at 1182.
45 Id.
41
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in the same jurisdiction who are no longer alive and who have
yet to be born.46 In other words, if judges are constrained “by
the necessity of justifying their decisions in written opinions,”47
doctrine serves as the primary intellectual ground where judges look to understand the form of reasoning that they must
employ throughout the opinion. Indeed, Professor Charles
Fried explicitly recognizes doctrine as an essential attribute of
judicial reasoning because it is doctrine that allows judges’
holdings to transcend the particular case at hand and structure
future behavior.48
The second constraining role for doctrine is institutional.
Whereas the theoretical role focuses on the judicial decisionprocess itself, the institutional role locates that decisionprocess within a larger institutional context that provides external constraints on judicial decisionmaking.49 More specifically, legal doctrine can be said to limit the choices that judges
make because institutional norms may foster a duty or obligation on the part of judges to ground their decisions in law.50
Perhaps the clearest example of a rules-based institutional
constraint comes in the form of precedent, or stare decisis,
which is the notion that previous rulings should guide current
decisions.51 While a complete discussion of precedent lies beyond the scope of this article, a short discussion of three scholarly works offers some empirical evidence for the constraining
influence of precedent on judicial discretion.
First, in analyzing the continuity between the Warren and
Burger Courts, some scholars have concluded that adherence to
46 See Charles Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140,
1156-57 (1994) (asserting that doctrine assures that judges will be mindful of
how courts have ruled in the past).
47 Schauer, supra note 7, at 663.
48 See Fried, supra note 46, at 1148-49.
49 See JACK KNIGHT & LEE EPSTEIN, THE CHOICES JUSTICES MAKE 10
(1997).
50 See Michael A. Bailey & Forrest Maltzman, Does Legal Doctrine Matter? Unpacking Law and Policy Preferences on the U.S. Supreme Court, 102
AM. POL. SCI REV. 369, 370 (2008) (asserting that these norms may arise from
law schools and the broader legal community); Schauer, supra note 7, at 664
(stating that, given the internalization of legal doctrine in society and law
school, it should come as no surprise that Supreme Court Justices are constrained by rules.).
51 Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 50, at 371.

2013]

LEGAL RHETORIC AND SOCIAL SCIENCE

383

precedent helps explain why the Burger Court, arguably at
ideological odds with the Warren Court, perpetuated, rather
than dismantled, the doctrinal underpinnings of the Warren
Court.52 With a hint of irony, scholar Anthony Lewis notes that
the conservative nature of the Burger Court prompted it to
abide by the judicial precedent set by the Warren Court, even
though the policy preferences of the Warren Court were not in
direct harmony with those of the Burger Court.53 Second, in
response to the Critical Legal Studies Movement’s contention
that rules are used to legitimate judicial preferences only after
the fact, Judge Alvin Rubin (then Judge on the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit) concludes that, “legal
doctrine is a real force, judges follow it, and they decide all but
a small fraction of the cases that come before them in accordance with what they perceive to be the controlling legal
rules.”54 Due to the fact that the composition of the three-judge
panel on the Court of Appeals level is constantly in flux, Judge
Rubin notes that it is adherence to precedent that allows for
some sort of continuity in rulings across the panels.55 Finally,
Michael Bailey and Forrest Maltzman rely on a sample set of
842 Supreme Court cases from the period of 1977 until 2003 to
show that precedent played (and still plays) an influential force
in the decisionmaking of thirteen Supreme Court Justices.56
B. The Doctrine That The Hypothesis Will Work With: Equal
Protection Scrutiny and the Brown/Parents Involved Opinions
A possibility for developing a legal hypothesis that contributes to the aforementioned debate emerges through a case
study of the Brown and Parents Involved opinions. While the
52 See Anthony Lewis, Foreword to THE BURGER COURT: THE COUNTERREVOLUTION THAT WASN’T , at vii-iii (Vincent Blasi ed., 1983); see also Schauer, supra note 7, at 656.
53 See Lewis, supra note 52, at viii.
54 Alvin B. Rubin, Does Law Matter? A Judge’s Response to the Critical
Legal Studies Movement, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 307, 307-08 (1987).
55 See id. at 310-12 (1987). Later on in the article, Judge Rubin provides
data from the Fifth Circuit during the years of 1981-1985 that supports his
idea that adherence to precedent allows for “decision by consensus.” Id. at
312.
56 See Bailey & Maltzman, supra note 50, at 374-77.
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research design of that case study is mapped out in the following section, the inspiration that the hypothesis pulls from this
case study is obvious. In general, constitutional cases at the
Supreme Court level allow us to most readily explore the interplay between judicial discretion and the purported constraints
of legal doctrine.57 This is the reason that this article focuses
on equal protection scrutiny. In particular, Professor Scott
Brewer has labeled Brown, “a remarkable culmination of the
legal realist project of taming abstract legal propositions with
the whip of social science.”58 Regardless of whether Brewer is
correct, his characterization of Brown in those terms invites
the use of opinions that employ social science to investigate
broader trends in legal theory and doctrine. This is the reason
that this article focuses on Brown and Parents Involved.
i. Equal Protection Scrutiny: The Contemporary Debate Over
Tiered Scrutiny and Justice Stevens’s Unmediated Approach
On its face, the traditional approach to equal protection
scrutiny is relatively easy to understand. Having roots in the
infamous footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products
Co.,59 equal protection scrutiny purports to embrace a tiered
form that governs when specific types of legislation are to be
declared presumptively invalid.60 On the one hand, courts employ rational basis review when a piece of legislation does not
burden a fundamental right or rely on a suspect classification.61
Granting Congress a presumption of legality, courts will uphold legislation if it has some rational relation to a legitimate

See POSNER, supra note 1, at 14 (stating that the constitutional context
is an area “where the decisional guidance provided by the orthodox legal materials is weakest.”).
58 Scott Brewer, Scientific Expert Testimony and Intellectual Due Process,
107 YALE L.J. 1535, 1553 (1998).
59 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938)
(contending that, “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities . . . may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”).
60 See Calvin Massey, The New Formalism: Requiem for Tiered Scrutiny?,
6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 945, 948 (2004).
61 See Randall P. Ewing, Jr., Same Sex-Marriage: A Threat to Tiered
Equal Protection Doctrine?, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 1409, 1413 (2008) (quoting
Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996)).
57
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governmental end.62 On the other hand, when a piece of legislation burdens a fundamental right or relies on a suspect classification, such as race or national origin, courts presume that
Congressional judgments cannot pass constitutional muster.63
Invoking the test of strict scrutiny, legislation can overcome
this presumption of illegality if it is narrowly tailored to serve a
compelling governmental purpose.64 Resting in between these
two extremes lies a form of equal protection scrutiny deemed
intermediate scrutiny. When Congress utilizes a quasi-suspect
classification, such as gender, in legislative enactments, courts
uphold such enactments if they are substantially related to the
accomplishment of an important governmental purpose.65
What proves to be more difficult to understand, however, is
the precise operation of tiered scrutiny within the framework of
judicial reasoning. This query has prompted many scholars to
rethink both the theoretical and practical viability of using a
formalized tiered scrutiny framework to adjudicate equal protection disputes.66 While a comprehensive overview of the criticisms leveled at tiered scrutiny lies well beyond the scope of
this article, it is beneficial to recognize where the current literature stands.67 While scholars will differ in making generalizations from this literature, current critiques of tiered scrutiny
can plausibly be read as taking two forms. First, tiered scrutiny has been criticized from a normative viewpoint, focusing on
its inability to confront constitutional norms. More specifically,
commentators have suggested that the tiered form constrains
the ability of judges to grapple with the normative demands of
the Equal Protection Clause by trivializing potentially im-

See id.
See Massey, supra note 60, at 949.
64 See Ewing, supra note 61, at 1413 (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 326 (2003)).
65 See Massey, supra note 60, at 950.
66 See Ewing, supra note 61, at 1413 (maintaining that tiered scrutiny
has been criticized since its inception); Siegel, supra note 9, at 2343 (commenting that tiered scrutiny remains the subject of sustained criticism).
67 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2343-46 (laying out three standard criticisms of tiered scrutiny); see also Ewing, supra note 61, at 1413-16 (stating
general critiques of modern Federal Equal Protection Doctrine).
62
63
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portant factors in the constitutional analysis.68 Second, tiered
scrutiny has been criticized from a descriptive viewpoint, focusing on the inconsistency of its application across and between
different levels of review.69
A critical analysis of the tiered framework has, in turn,
produced numerous proposals for doctrinal reformation, which
have ranged from reworking the tiered framework to parting
ways with the tiered form altogether.70 Yet, what has remained relatively consistent is that “academic critics of modern
equal protection doctrine tend to treat the writings of Justice
Stevens (and Justice Marshall) as prophetic and inspirational.”71 Ever since Justice Stevens famously declared that
“[t]here is only one Equal Protection Clause,”72 his approach to
equal protection jurisprudence continues to be applauded as a
plausible alternative to tiered scrutiny. Within the midst of
this praise, however, the exact posture of Justice Stevens’s approach has not been conclusively resolved. To be sure, his
methodology is currently viewed under a variety of lenses.73
One such lens strikes me as particularly enlightening. In what
is arguably one of the most rigorous analyses of Justice Stevens’s equal protection jurisprudence, Professor Andrew Siegel,
who served as a clerk for Justice Stevens, suggests that Justice

68 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2344-45; see also James E. Fleming, “There
is Only One Equal Protection Clause”: An Appreciation of Justice Stevens’s
Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2301, 2302 (2006) (explaining that Justice Stevens views the tiered framework as hindering the
ability of judges to make judgments about constitutional norms).
69 See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV.
481, 513-14 (2004) (discussing the inconsistency of rational basis review);
Massey, supra note 60, at 945 (arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions
have undercut the ability to rely on tiered scrutiny for consistent application).
70 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2346 (noting the wide range of reforms).
For examples of particular reform projects, see Goldberg, supra note 69, at
491-92 (advocating a single standard with three inquiries); Massey, supra
note 60, at 992-93 (arguing that a possible reform includes a value-selection
approach where justices openly articulate what values are protected by the
Constitution).
71 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2347.
72 Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 211 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
73 See Ewing, supra note 61, at 1416-17 (classifying Justice Stevens’s approach as a modified form of rational basis review); Fleming, supra note 68,
at 2311 (analogizing Justice Stevens’s approach to Justice Marshall’s “spectrum of standards” approach).
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Stevens advances an unmediated interpretive theory.74 Describing what an unmediated approach might look like, Siegel
writes:
In rough form, an unmediated approach to equal protection jurisprudence would begin by ascertaining in a largely nonlinguistic way a vision of the "equality" promised by the text. It would
then proceed to frame every inquiry into the constitutionality of
governmental action around the question whether that vision is
thwarted by the regulatory scheme in question. In ascertaining
the appropriate answer in any given case, a judge applying such
a methodology might-and probably should-ask a variety of questions about the challenged statute, its impact on individuals, and
the various overlapping contexts in which it emerged, but such a
jurist would not be compelled to ask any particular set of questions in any given case or to reach a particular conclusion based
on the matrix of answers he or she receives to those questions.75

More recently, Professor William Araiza has confirmed this
interpretation of Justice Stevens’s equal protection jurisprudence.76
ii. The Brown/Parents Involved Opinions: Judicial Scrutiny
and Social Science
Brown represents a firm denial of state-sponsored racial
segregation in the context of lower school public education.77
Responding to Plessy v. Ferguson’s contention that social differences between the races mandated separate, yet equal,
treatment,78 Brown states the following: “We conclude that in
See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2351. Professor Siegel’s argument finds
support in another piece of scholarship focusing solely on Justice Stevens. In
a 1987 student note, the author writes that, “Justice Stevens' method . . .
permits advocates directly to address the issue concerning the Court: whether
the classification in its context violates a norm of equal protection.” Note, supra note 12, at 1160-61.
75 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2352.
76 See William D. Araiza, Justice Stevens and Constitutional Adjudication: The Law Beyond the Rules, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 889, 896-97 (2011).
77 Sanjay Mody, Note, Brown Footnote Eleven in Historical Context: Social Science and the Supreme Court’s Quest for Legitimacy, 54 STAN. L. REV.
793, 796 (2002).
78 See Michael W. Combs & Gwendolyn M. Combs, Revisiting Brown v.
Board of Education: A Cultural, Historical-Legal, and Political Perspective,
74
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the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’
has no place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”79 Two themes permeate the Court’s decision.80 First,
Chief Justice Earl Warren stressed the changing status of public education in the South during the middle of the twentieth
century.81 Indeed, he writes that, “[t]oday, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments . . . [i]t is the very foundation of good citizenship.”82 Second, and most important for our purposes, the Court
recognized, in footnote eleven,83 that segregation visited psychological harm upon black children.84 In that footnote, the
Court cited to research conducted by Dr. Kenneth Clark85 that
concluded that segregation impeded the development of black
children’s personalities.86 While that study has been a main
talking point in analyzing the Warren Court’s reliance on social
science data,87 it must be noted that footnote eleven contains
other non-legal sources, such as An American Dilemma by
Gunnar Myrdal and The Negro in the United States by E.
Franklin Frazier.88
After Brown, legal doctrine in the area of dismantling segregation relied on a distinction between segregation resulting
from intentional governmental actions, called de jure segregation, and segregation resulting from actions outside the purview of the government, called de facto segregation.89 De jure
segregation refers to a school system’s deliberate design to seg47 HOW. L.J. 627, 636 (2004).
79 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
80 These themes are taken from the work of Sanjay Mody. See Mody, supra note 77, at 796-802.
81 See id. at 798 (stating that when the Fourteenth Amendment was
drafted, public education did not occupy an important place in the South).
82 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
83 Id. at 495 n.11.
84 See Heise, supra note 19, at 293-96.
85 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.11.
86 See Combs & Combs, supra note 78, at 640-41.
87 See Heise, supra note 19, at 294 (arguing that Dr. Clark’s research is a
primary reason that footnote eleven has come under sustained scrutiny).
88 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495 n.11.
89 See Jonathan Fischbach, Will Rhee, & Robert Cacace, Race at the Pivot
Point: The Future of Race-Based Policies to Remedy De Jure Segregation After
Parents Involved in Community Schools, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.REV. 491, 496
(2008).
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regate students on the basis of race as a result of local ordinances or state statutes.90 In turn, this type of segregation
constitutionally necessitates a remedy by the government.91 In
contrast, de facto segregation refers to the presence of a racial
imbalance brought about by housing patterns or other forms of
societal inequalities not directly caused by governmental action.92 Due to the fact that this type of segregation is not per se
unconstitutional, a court cannot order a school district to implement a desegregation policy.93
Parents Involved, an opinion that relies on the de jure/de
facto distinction, presented the question whether it was constitutional under the Equal Protection Clause for school districts
to voluntarily consider race as a factor in assigning kids to specific schools in order to foster racial and ethnic heterogeneity.94
On the facts of the case, school districts in Seattle and Louisville had used race as a factor in determining “whether a student could attend the school of his or her choice.”95 Between
the two districts, however, different policies were employed.96
They varied both in terms of the breadth of the policy’s application and in terms of the desired racial composition of each
school in reference to broader racial patterns of the school district as a whole.97 The policies did converge on one point: that
a racially diverse learning environment is a moral good and,
consequently, a compelling state interest.98
In anticipation of the case study, I use two observations to
frame how different justices approached the case. First, the
justices differed in their reading of desegregation doctrine and
See id. at 496.
See Rachel Elliot & Natalie Soter, Note, Race-Based Decision MakingNarrowly Tailored or Narrow Minded? Breaking Open Our Definition of Diversity, 3 EMPIRE C. L. REV. 33, 38 (2008).
92 See id. at 39.
93 See Fischbach, Rhee, & Cacace, supra note 89, at 504.
94 See Sharon L. Browne & Elizabeth A. Yi, The Spirit of Brown in Parents Involved and Beyond, 63 U. MIAMI L. REV. 657, 658 (2009); Jonathan L.
Entin, Parents Involved and the Meaning of Brown: An Old Debate Renewed,
31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 923, 924 (2008).
95 Browne & Yi, supra note 94, at 658.
96 See id.
97 See Entin, supra note 94, at 924-25.
98 See Love, supra note 18, at 131.
90
91
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the fate it held for the school’s policies as a matter of law.99
Second, they differed in their interpretation of the relevant social science literature.100 For the sake of making the upcoming
case study as clear as possible, I focus only on the opinions of
Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer and
exclude those of Justice Kennedy and Justice Stevens.101
Applying strict scrutiny102 and emphatically relying on the
history of Brown, Chief Justice John Roberts, joined in full by
Justices Alito, Scalia, and Thomas,103 struck down the assignment policies as violating the constitutional mandate of equal
protection of the laws.104 Two themes undergird the Chief Justice’s opinion. First, Chief Justice Roberts makes it painstakingly clear that he believed Brown to require elementary
schools to adopt a colorblind attitude in assignment policies,
even if the purpose of the policies is to foster racial integration.105 To be sure, Roberts writes the following:
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and
could not go to school based on the color of their skin. The school
districts in these cases have not carried the heavy burden of
demonstrating that we should allow this once again . . . . The way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.106

Second, Roberts did not explicitly cite to any social science
99 The scholarly literature is replete with commentary documenting the
justices’ invocation of Brown in the opinion. For a taste of that scholarship,
see the following articles. See James E. Fleming, Rewriting Brown, Resurrecting Plessy, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1141 (2008); Pamela S. Karlan, What Can
Brown Do For You?: Neutral Principles and the Struggle Over the Equal
Protection Clause, 58 DUKE L.J. 1049 (2009); David A. Strauss, Little Rock
and the Legacy of Brown, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1065 (2008).
100 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 717.
101 I do not believe that this exclusion renders my hypothesis any less
forceful. Rather, by focusing my analysis on these three Justices, I am able
to present the case study’s variables, that of judicial scrutiny and the use of
social science data, in the clearest light. After all, it is my overly-optimistic
hope that the hypothesis has something to say when applied beyond Brown
and Parents Involved.
102 See Love, supra note 18, at 132.
103 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701 (2007) (plurality opinion) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part).
104 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
105 Browne & Yi, supra note 94, at 658.
106 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747-48.
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data.107 While Roberts did make reference to the social science
data cited in the amicus briefs, he did not give the social science literature a causal role in the outcome of his opinion.108
Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion in which he
seemed to take Justice Roberts’s reasoning to its logical conclusion. That is, Thomas analogized arguments made in favor of
the assignment policies to arguments made by segregationists
during the era of Brown.109 For Thomas, race serves no legitimate role in classifying students in the context of public education.110 Invoking strict scrutiny, Thomas asserts that, “[a]s
these programs demonstrate, every time the government uses
racial criteria to ‘bring the races together,’ . . . someone gets excluded, and the person excluded suffers an injury solely because of his or her race.”111 Regarding the social science data,
Thomas subscribed to the view that he need only consider evidence of de jure segregation.112 Since, for Thomas, mere
“[r]acial imbalance is not segregation,”113 evidence of de facto
segregation held no relevance in assessing the constitutionality
of the race-based programs at issue.114
Justice Breyer filed a forceful dissenting opinion. Mirroring both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice
Breyer purported to apply traditional strict scrutiny analysis.115 However, unlike those Justices, Justice Breyer concluded that the school board plans of Seattle and Louisville were
permitted under the Constitution.116 A handful of key interpretive moves on the part of Justice Breyer may make clear why
107 Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 732-33 (arguing that Roberts’s extraordinarily strict criteria for allowing social science data into the
opinion probably rendered many applicable studies irrelevant).
108 See Morgan & Pullin, supra note 37, at 521.
109 See Christopher W. Schmidt, Brown and the Colorblind Constitution,
94 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 212 (2008); Brad Snyder, What Would Justice
Holmes Do (WWJHD)?: Rehnquist’s Plessy Memo, Majoritarianism, and Parents Involved, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 873, 902 (2008).
110 See Browne & Yi, supra note 94, at 675.
111 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 759 (Thomas, J., concurring).
112 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 715.
113 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 750 (Thomas, J., concurring).
114 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 715.
115 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
116 Id.
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his opinion came out the way that it did. Justice Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny seemed to be informed by a contextual approach that took into account the benign purpose behind
the race-conscious policies.117 To be sure, Justice Breyer opines
that, “[t]he context here is one of racial limits that seek, not to
keep the races apart, but to bring them together.”118 As a result, Justice Breyer did not think that the de jure/de facto distinction controlled “what a school district is voluntarily allowed
to do.”119 Negating the validity of this distinction, Justice
Breyer considered evidence of de facto segregation relevant in
framing the racial harm that the school districts could constitutionally correct.120
III. A HYPOTHESIS FOR WHY DOCTRINE MATTERS: THE
BROWN/PARENTS INVOLVED CASE STUDY
This section directly enters the debate over judicial decisionmaking by supplying a hypothesis that serves to counteract
any talismanic enchantment with a purely political explanation
for Supreme Court decisionmaking. The proposed hypothesis
treads carefully. While it aims to illustrate that doctrine matters in some nontrivial way throughout the course of judicial
decisionmaking, it does not pretend to prove that doctrine is all
that matters. In other words, the hypothesis is in line with
Frederick Schauer’s proposition that legal doctrine helps to
structure, rather than consume, the thinking of judges.121
Therefore, as seen in Part A below, the hypothesis contextualizes Schauer’s proposition within the Court’s use of social science data.
In order to instill the hypothesis with explanatory power in
the equal protection context, I analyze the Brown and Parents
Involved opinions by asking the following two questions: first,
is there a change in how judicial scrutiny was articulated in
Brown as opposed to Parents Involved and second, did that
change matter in terms of the types of social science data used
See Love, supra note 18, at 133-34.
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 835 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
119 Id. at 844.
120 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 714.
121 See Schauer, supra note 7, at 664.
117
118
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in the two opinions? I answer both questions in the affirmative. In Part B, I argue that while the Brown opinion can plausibly be viewed as adopting something like Justice Stevens’s
unmediated approach,122 each opinion in Parents Involved employed some form of strict scrutiny analysis.123 In Part C, I
then argue that this doctrinal difference influenced how specific types of social science sources became relevant to the legal
issue at hand by prompting, or failing to prompt, the justices to
filter their choice of social science data through additional legal
doctrine beyond the standard of review.124
A. The Hypothesis in Detail
At times, the formality of legal doctrine can call for the use
of “elaborate technical vocabularies.”125 Indeed, Professor Victoria Nourse has recognized a scholarly consensus that observes how doctrine has been utilizing a more formalized vocabulary over time.126 Moreover, Professor Robert Nagel has
described the Court’s rhetoric as “an amalgam of the bureaucratic and the academic.”127 Given the tenor of these statements, it does not seem outrageous to suggest that the technical vocabulary that these scholars had in mind looks
something like strict scrutiny’s use of the terms “compelling
purpose” and “narrowly tailored.”128 The hypothesis seeks to
understand the effect of this technical vocabulary, as enunciated in the standard of review, on judicial consideration of social
See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2352.
See Love, supra note 18, at 132-33.
124 I must give credit to Professor Siegel for acknowledging that the mere
existence of a complex doctrinal framework may have a “distortive or transformative effect, building substantive content into the body of constitutional
law.” Siegel, supra note 9, at 2346.
125 Marouf Hasian, Jr., Celeste Michelle Condit, & John Louis Lucaites,
The Rhetorical Boundaries of ‘the Law’: A Consideration of the Rhetorical
Culture of Legal Practice and the Case of the ‘Separate But Equal’ Doctrine,
82 Q.J. SPEECH 323, 325 (1996).
126 See Victoria F. Nourse, Making Constitutional Doctrine in a Realist
Age, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 1401, 1402 (1997).
127 Robert F. Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165,
177 (1985).
128 See Siegel, supra note 9, at 2345 (noting that the rhetoric of strict
scrutiny might qualify as a “complicated doctrinal structure”).
122
123

394

PACE INT’L L. REV. ONLINE COMPANION

[Vol. 3::11

science sources.
The hypothesis of this article contends that judges feel
more legitimated in interacting with a broader range of nonlegal sources when they apply a less formal standard of review
that contains little, if any, technical legal words because the
standard of review frames the legal issue in linguistic terms
that are discursively accessible to other disciplines. This discursive accessibility, in turn, ensures that an additional legal
construct is not needed to render intelligible a link between the
legal issue and the non-legal sources. Thus, non-legal sources
need only compete with the substantive content embodied in
the legal issue in order to enter the opinion; these sources need
not fight through an additional legal construct, and its potentially disarming legal rhetoric, to reach that content in the first
place.
However, when judges employ a formalized judicial scrutiny that relies heavily on a technical legal vocabulary, as something like strict scrutiny does, judges feel more comfortable in
giving initial meaning to that vocabulary by citing to more legal doctrine. This time, the standard of review frames the legal
issue in linguistic terms that are discursively accessible only to
more legal language. As the amount of legal language multiplies, the opportunity for non-legal sources to help draw out
that language also multiplies due to the ever-increasing possibility that the legal rhetoric will touch upon a principle of
thought that transcends the legal arena. Yet, this process of
legal language multiplication comes at a cost. While this process can indeed provide the principle of thought that serves as
an access point into the social science literature, it does so only
by connecting that principle to the primary legal issue through
a legal construct. As a result, this exercise in linguistics limits
the types of social science sources that enter the opinion to
those that can comport with the rhetoric of this additional legal
construct.
B. A Closer Look at the Articulation of Judicial Scrutiny in
Brown and Parents Involved
A satisfactory evaluation of judicial scrutiny employed in
an opinion should focus on the language of the opinion itself in
addition to how scholars have categorized that scrutiny. Both
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methods of analysis are adopted here in examining the type of
judicial scrutiny applied in Brown and Parents Involved. The
argument here is simple: while Brown can be interpreted as
adopting Justice Stevens’s unmediated approach,129 Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas, and Justice Breyer implemented
some version of strict scrutiny analysis in Parents Involved.130
i. Brown’s Unmediated Standard of Review
Any discussion of the judicial scrutiny used in Brown
should be informed by the fact that strict scrutiny was first
enunciated as applying to racial classifications in cases involving Japanese Americans challenging their internment in the
midst of World War II.131 To be sure, Professors Greg and Toni
Robinson maintain that, “the most decisive contribution of the
Japanese Americans to the legal struggle for civil rights was in
laying the foundation for the doctrine of strict scrutiny on
which Brown and the other cases were based.”132 The 1944 Supreme Court case of Korematsu v. United States133 serves as a
case in point. In that case, Toyosaburo Korematsu, an American citizen, was convicted for remaining in an unauthorized
military zone in California.134 Justice Black begins the opinion
by declaring the following:
It should be noted . . . that all legal restrictions which curtail the
civil rights of a single racial group are immediately suspect. That
is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional. It is
to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny. 135

Given this strong language, commentators awaiting the
Brown decision ten years later could reasonably have assumed
that Chief Justice Earl Warren would cite to Korematsu or othSee id. at 2352.
See Love, supra note 18, at 132-33.
131 See Greg Robinson & Toni Robinson, Korematsu and Beyond: Japanese Americans and the Origins of Strict Scrutiny, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
29, 30, 32 (2005).
132 See id. at 30. As we will see shortly, the authors’ invocation of Brown
is misleading. Nonetheless, their point is well taken.
133 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
134 Id. at 215-16.
135 Id.
129
130
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er Japanese internment cases to strike down segregation in
public education. Indeed, the segregation at issue in Brown
was arguably a restriction which burdened “the civil rights of a
single racial group.”136 However, the Brown opinion is devoid
of any such citation.
If Brown was not decided under a doctrine of strict scrutiny laid down during the Japanese internment cases, what type
of judicial scrutiny did Chief Justice Warren apply? The language of Brown itself is instructive. Chief Justice Warren
acknowledged from the outset that every District Court in the
case, other than Delaware,137 and six previous Supreme Court
cases decided after Plessy applied the “separate but equal” doctrine.138 He went on to say that the “separate but equal” doctrine itself had not been challenged in previous cases involving
public education.139 After proclaiming that the equality of educational facilities must take into account intangible factors,140
Chief Justice Warren phrases the question presented to the
Court as follows: “[d]oes segregation of children in public
schools solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the
children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?”141 In what can plausibly be read as the holding, Chief
Justice Warren states that, “in the field of public education the
doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place”142 and that,
“[s]eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”143
Given the absence of any explicit language recognizing a
form of judicial scrutiny, it is difficult to pinpoint the precise
form of scrutiny in the case.144 Chief Justice Warren was simp136 Id. Perhaps an answer can be found if we allow for the possibility
that lower school education did not constitute a “civil right” within the meaning of the Korematsu language. I find this highly unlikely, though, due to
Chief Justice Warren’s detailed discussion of the importance of public education. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
137 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 488.
138 See id. at 491.
139 See id.
140 See id. at 492 (stating that the Court’s decision “cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible factors”).
141 Id. at 493.
142 Id. at 495.
143 Id.
144 See Jack Balkin, What Brown Teaches Us About Constitutional Theo-
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ly unclear in articulating the doctrinal grounds on which the
case rested. What I wish to suggest, though, is that Justice
Stevens’s unmediated approach to constitutional interpretation
inspired Chief Justice Warren’s framing of the legal question.
Recall, Justice Stevens’s approach “[i]nvolves nothing more and
nothing less than the direct and unmediated application of the
Constitution's guarantee of ‘equal protection of the laws.’”145
While Chief Justice Warren did not use the phrase “equal protection of the laws” in presenting the legal question at hand, he
nonetheless asked whether segregation deprived “children of
the minority group of equal educational opportunities.”146 In
my mind, Chief Justice Warren’s phrasing is as close as one
can get to applying the actual language of the Fourteenth
Amendment to a concrete fact pattern.
At first blush, one could offer a retort by making the argument that the case was decided in light of the mediating doctrine of “separate but equal.” Indeed, some scholars have made
that argument.147 However, this reading seems unlikely for
two reasons. First, a case cannot be decided on a ground that
is explicitly rejected in the opinion itself. Applying this to
Brown, if the “separate but equal” doctrine was ultimately rejected in the context of public education, the decision could not
possibly have turned on this doctrine alone. There must have
been some broader constitutional principle at play, presumably
the phrase “equal protection of the laws,”148 that provided Chief
Justice Warren with the criteria for determining whether the
“separate but equal” doctrine was appropriate in the first place.
Second, after stating the holding, Chief Justice Warren writes
that, “[w]e have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws.”149 With that sentence,
ry, 90 VA. L. REV. 1537, 1564 (2004) (stating that when Brown was handed
down, the import of the opinion was unclear).
145 Siegel, supra note 9, at 2351.
146 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
147 See Edward J. Erler, Still Separate But Equal, CLAREMONT REV.
BOOKS 47, 48 (Summer 2004) (arguing that although the Warren Court could
have overturned the “separate but equal” doctrine, it chose to perpetuate it
throughout the opinion).
148 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
149 Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
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Chief Justice Warren gives us a first-hand account of what he
thought Brown stood for. And, of course, the “separate but
equal” doctrine is nowhere to be found.
Since the language of the opinion is concededly ambiguous,
the writings of two scholars investigating Brown in more detail
may offer some insight into the judicial scrutiny applied. Stating that the negative implications of Brown must be appreciated, Professor Parker posits that, “while the facts presented in
the case included a suspect classification, state legislation and
an equal protection challenge, the Court failed to refer to the
traditional strict scrutiny test.”150 Although Professor Parker
does not give a positive account for what standard of review
was employed, Professor Frank Read does. In an article that
surveys desegregation doctrine in the wake of Brown, Professor
Read writes, “the opinion in Brown I is, at its essence, a
straight-forward legal interpretation of the equal protection
clause.”151 This is probably the clearest corroboration for the
idea that Justice Stevens’s interpretive theory inspired Chief
Justice Warren’s decision.
ii. Parents Involved and The Variants of Strict Scrutiny
Any description of the judicial scrutiny used in Parents Involved is manifestly easier to construct than that of Brown
primarily because the three Justices that I focus on in Parents
Involved are explicit about the standard of review they subscribed to. With that being said, there is a key difference in
how the standard of review was invoked between Chief Justice
Roberts and Justice Thomas, on the one hand, and Justice
Breyer, on the other. Mirroring the analysis of Brown, the description of judicial scrutiny in Parents Involved begins with
the language of the opinion itself.
At the beginning of the plurality opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts makes it clear that he believed that strict scrutiny
must control the case.152 That is, Chief Justice Roberts states
that, “the school districts must demonstrate that the use of inParker, supra note 17, at 227.
Read, supra note 20, at 9.
152 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 720 (2007).
150
151
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dividual racial classifications in the assignment plans here under review is ‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve a ‘compelling’ government interest.”153 Throughout the opinion, Chief Justice
Roberts dismissed the idea of applying a different standard of
review to racial classifications that serve praiseworthy, rather
than destructive, ends by stating that “all racial classifications
must be reviewed under strict scrutiny.”154 Justice Thomas’s
concurrence, which was written to address several arguments
made by Justice Breyer,155 does not contest Chief Justice Roberts’s invocation and application of strict scrutiny. Like Chief
Justice Roberts, Justice Thomas dismissed the idea that a different standard of review should be applied when programs use
racial classifications to advance a benign purpose.156
On its face, it would seem that Justice Breyer’s dissent did
not depart from his colleagues on the issue of judicial scrutiny
because he insisted that he was applying strict scrutiny.157 Indeed, Justice Breyer states that he will conduct his inquiry as
follows: “I shall consequently ask whether the school boards in
Seattle and Louisville adopted these plans to serve a ‘compelling governmental interest’ and, if so, whether the plans are
‘narrowly tailored’ to achieve that interest.”158 However true
that may be, it is also true that Justice Breyer was informed by
a “contextual approach to scrutiny”159 that appreciates the distinction that Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas were
quick to condemn, that of using race to exclude as opposed to
include.160 To be sure, Justice Breyer writes that, “the ’fundamental purpose’ of strict scrutiny review is to ‘take relevant differences’ between ‘fundamentally different situations . . . into
account’”161 and that, “the law requires application here of a
standard of review that is not ‘strict’ in the traditional sense of

Id. (citing Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
Id. at 741.
155 Id. at 748 (Thomas, J., concurring).
156 Id. at 758.
157 Id. at 837 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
158 Id.
159 Id.
160 Id. at 834-35.
161 Id. (citing Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 228 (1995)).
153
154
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that word.”162 Nevertheless, Justice Breyer acknowledged that
some sort of rigorous review was called for as “the judge would
carefully examine the program's details to determine whether
the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the important ends it serves.”163 While indeed purporting to apply
the strictures of strict scrutiny, one must wonder to what extent this “contextual approach” actually structured Justice
Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny.
Turning to the academic commentary, it is relatively clear
that there is no serious contestation that Chief Justice Roberts
and Justice Thomas applied, or thought they applied, strict
scrutiny review.164 Instead, the more interesting debate revolves around the type of scrutiny that Justice Breyer utilized.
Nicole Love explicitly addresses Justice Breyer’s “contextual
approach” to strict scrutiny.165 Love tends to believe that not
only did the “contextual approach” inform Justice Breyer’s application of strict scrutiny (as I do), but that it also supplanted
strict scrutiny review altogether.166 Paralleling Love, Professor
Brad Snyder has recognized another area where Justice Breyer’s purported application of strict scrutiny departed from that
of the plurality. Specifically, he points out that Justice Breyer
concluded his opinion “with a Holmesian plea for deference to
elected officials.”167 Both Chief Justice Roberts168 and Justice
Thomas169 rebuked this grant of deference as being adverse to
traditional strict scrutiny principles.
C. The Effect of Scrutiny on Judicial Consideration of Social
Science in Brown and Parents Involved: Filtering Social
Science Sources Through Additional Legal Doctrine Above and
Id. at 837.
Id.
164 See Browne & Yi, supra note 94, at 674 (stating that the plurality
opinion declined the invitation to depart from a strict scrutiny analysis);
Love, supra note 18, at 133 (noting that Justice Thomas endorsed strict scrutiny).
165 See Love, supra note 18, at 133-34.
166 See id. at 133 (stating that Justice Breyer employed a “contextual approach” to scrutiny without qualification).
167 Snyder, supra note 109, at 905.
168 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 744-45 (plurality opinion).
169 See id. at 774 (Thomas, J., concurring).
162
163
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Beyond the Standard of Review?
Once the difference in the articulation of scrutiny employed in Brown and Parents Involved has been established
with some level of precision, the next task involves understanding whether that difference holds any power in explaining how
different types of social science sources made their way into
these opinions. In the words of Julie Margetta Morgan and Diana Pullin, “[i]f Brown raised the possibility that judges might
use social science in decision making, it also gave rise to enduring questions of how and why particular research was selected.”170 In this section, the research selection in Brown and
Parents Involved is evaluated in light of the specific type of
scrutiny applied.
The argument in this section runs as follows. On the one
hand, Brown’s adoption of Justice Stevens’s unmediated approach to judicial scrutiny granted the Warren Court great
flexibility in deeming certain types of social science sources relevant to the legal issue at hand because a direct application of
the constitutional text171 did not prompt the Court to filter
those sources through any additional legal construct. On the
other hand, the articulation of strict scrutiny in Chief Justice
Roberts’s plurality opinion and Justice Thomas’s concurrence
in Parents Involved inspired these two Justices to rely on the
distinction between de jure and de facto segregation172 to define
the legally relevant harm that could be voluntarily remedied.
In turn, that distinction served to filter the type of social science sources that these two Justices found relevant to the legal
question at hand.173 Because, as we have seen, Justice Breyer’s
application of strict scrutiny differed from that of both the
Chief Justice and Justice Thomas, his legal reasoning does not
appear to be constrained by the de jure/de facto distinction174
Morgan & Pullin, supra note 37, at 515.
See Read, supra note 20, at 9 (arguing that Brown directly applied the
constitutional text of the Fourteenth Amendment to the legal issue presented).
172 See Browne & Yi, supra note 94, at 673.
173 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 710.
174 Michael L. Wells, Race-Conscious Student Assignment Plans After
Parents Involved: Bringing State Action Principles to Bear on the De Jure/De
170
171
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and, therefore, did not rely on that construct to filter the social
science literature.175
i. Brown: Social Science Unfiltered By Additional Legal
Doctrine
Recall that in the Brown opinion, Chief Justice Warren
dropped a footnote that cited to various social science sources
documenting the psychological harm that segregation imposed
on black children.176 Over time, footnote eleven has generated
controversy that has found expression in the form of two distinct debates.177 Although “Brown’s overall legacy will likely
remain a subject of vigorous debate in the future,”178 it would
serve us well to understand the general tenor of those debates
so that we can see how this article departs from them. To be
clear, the discussion here is not meant to advance either of
these two debates for my inquiry does not, at this time, purport
to involve normative questions of institutional competence or
descriptive questions of how particular social science sources
are used to supplement legal reasoning once included in the
opinion.
The first debate is extremely broad in scope and centers on
the propriety of using social science to validate normative
judgments about the Constitution.179 This debate asks whether
courts are institutionally competent enough to sift through
complex social science studies to determine which ones are persuasive and then integrate those studies into their legal reasoning.180 Scholars who have criticized the Court for relying on
this interdisciplinary approach have stated that, “attaching
constitutional meaning to scientific opinion . . . condemns the
Constitution to fluctuations in meaning as scientific knowledge
Facto Distinction, 112 PENN ST. L. REV. 1023, 1031 (2008).
175 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 714.
176 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954).
177 I acknowledge Michael Heise’s work in helping to frame where the
current literature on footnote eleven stands. See Heise, supra note 19, at 294
(laying out two general attacks against the use of footnote eleven in the
Brown opinion).
178 Id. at 296.
179 See Brewer, supra note 58, at 1562.
180 See id. at 1562-64.
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changes.”181 The work of prominent legal theorist Ronald
Dworkin has been read to further suggest that the social sciences are an inadequate foundation to rest constitutional rulings on.182 On the other side of the debate, some scholars have
applauded the Court’s willingness to cite to social science
sources as a way of ensuring that constitutional decisions are
not at the mercy of “arbitrary judicial biases.”183
The second debate is narrower in scope and attempts to
understand whether the Warren Court’s citation to social science sources in footnote eleven actually influenced the outcome
of the case.184 This debate has produced an enormous literature, to the point that Professor James Ryan has described the
debate as a “tired”185 one, and, as such, I can only touch on it
here. In general and at the risk of oversimplification, two
camps of scholars have participated in this debate.186 In the
first camp, scholars who believe that the Court should, as a
normative matter, look to social science sources for guidance
tend to assume that the Warren Court did in fact rely on footnote eleven in determining the outcome of Brown.187 In contrast, the second camp, including scholars such as Herbert
Wechsler188 and Charles Black,189 asserts that it is doubtful
that the Court was influenced in any significant way by footnote eleven. Recently, Sanjay Mody argues that footnote eleven should be seen as a legitimacy-enhancing tactic that at181 David L. Faigman, “Normative Constitutional Fact-Finding”: Exploring the Empirical Component of Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L.
REV. 541, 573 (1991).
182 See id. at 569; see also Ronald Dworkin, Social Sciences and Constitutional Rights—The Consequences of Uncertainty, 6 J.L & EDUC. 3, 5 (1977).
183 PAUL ROSEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 157 (1972).
184 For an article that nicely structures the debate and attempts to move
it in a new direction, see Mody, supra note 77, at 796.
185 Ryan, supra note 14, at 1660.
186 I note that I categorize these two camps differently than Sanjay Mody.
See Mody, supra note 77, at 804.
187 See id.
188 See Wechsler, supra note 26, at 33 (noting that it is hard to think that
Brown “turned upon the facts.”).
189 See Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 430 n.25 (1960) (stating that the footnote can be
seen as supporting intuition).
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tempted to anchor Brown in the social science community amid
legal controversy.190
What both of these debates have in common is that they
tend to focus on the doll study conducted by Dr. Clark191 as adequately embodying the intellectual essence of the other
sources cited in footnote eleven. That is to say, a majority of
the articles that have been instrumental in the previous two
debates focus almost exclusively on Dr. Clark’s doll study as
representing the substantive content of the other types of
sources consulted in footnote eleven.192 For example, Edmond
Cahn’s famous critique of the Warren Court’s reliance on social
science focuses exclusively on Dr. Clark’s work.193 After reading Professor Cahn’s work, it would seem that footnote eleven
contained only one source, as opposed to the seven actually cited. Furthermore, in noting that the social science sources in
footnote eleven suffered from serious limitations, Professor
Scott Brewer also seems to equate “the studies on which the
Court relied”194 with Dr. Clark’s research.
When looked at more carefully, however, footnote eleven is
found to contain citations to An American Dilemma by Gunnar
Myrdal and The Negro in the United States by E. Franklin Frazier.195 In An American Dilemma, published in 1944, Myrdal
undertakes a comprehensive study of race relations in the
United States during the period leading up to Brown. Utilizing
a multidisciplinary approach, Myrdal concludes that problems
of “racism, discrimination, denial, and violence” 196 permeated
encounters with the black population. In turn, Myrdal’s book
played a central role in the “sociological and historical attack
upon segregation.”197 What is most important for our purposes
See Mody, supra note 77, at 794.
For an overview of that study, see Brewer, supra note 58, at 1558.
192 See Heise, supra note 19, at 313 (reducing footnote eleven to the work
of Dr. Clark).
193 See Edmond Cahn, Jurisprudence, 30 N.Y.U. L. REV. 150, 159-65
(1955).
194 Brewer, supra note 58, at 1557-58.
195 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 n.11 (1954).
196 Jon G. Crawford & Linda J. O’Neil, A Mere Footnote? An American Dilemma and Supreme Court School Desegregation Jurisprudence, 86 PEABODY
J. EDUC. 506, 508-09 (2011).
197 BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, at 21 (Mark
Whitman ed., 2004).
190
191
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is that Myrdal’s study of race relations is not confined to the
public education context. To be sure, Myrdal writes that, “social segregation and discrimination is a system of deprivations
forced upon the Negro group by the white group.”198 To add content to this observation, Myrdal observes the inner-workings of
segregation within the context of churches, schools, public
transportation, and the theater.199 In The Negro in the United
States, Dr. Frazier’s general objective is to examine how the
black population had assimilated into a culture colored by
white privilege.200 In the words of Leon Epstein, Dr. Frazier
“examined the life of the Negro under the slave regime, the accommodations of the Civil War and Reconstruction period . . .
and the present problems of adjustment in the United
States.”201 Like Myrdal’s work, The Negro in the United States
held (and might still hold) implications for understanding the
harms of segregation in contexts beyond that of public education.
At this point, recall that the legal question in Brown arose
in the context of public education. At first glance, it is not at
all obvious how a legal issue confined to this specific context
could be informed by a citation to sources comprising such
breadth and depth. Indeed, perhaps one of the reasons that
scholars choose to focus solely on the work of Dr. Clark is because his study of black schoolchildren is directly tied to the
public education context. However, a possible answer becomes
clear once we recall how Chief Justice Warren frames the legal
issue in Brown: “[d]oes segregation of children in public schools
solely on the basis of race, even though the physical facilities
and other ‘tangible’ factors may be equal, deprive the children
of the minority group of equal educational opportunities?”202 In
framing the issue as a direct application of the Equal Protection Clause,203 it becomes imperative to define what “equal”
198 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA (1944), reprinted in BROWN
BOARD OF EDUCATION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 22 (Mark Whitman ed.,
2004).
199 Id. at 22-23.
200 See Leon D. Epstein, Book Review, 2 W. POL. Q. 674, 675 (1949).
201 Id. at 674.
202 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (emphasis added).
203 See Read, supra note 20, at 9.
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means in any given circumstance. Yet, this is no easy task.
Where might one go to even begin to define how that term operates in a specific segment of society?
Comprehensive studies such as An American Dilemma and
The Negro in the United States might be a perfectly logical and
acceptable starting point. For the Warren Court, these works
may have provided broader social context to segregation so that
the Court could even begin to think about what “equal educational opportunities” might look like in a society riddled with
racial inequality. Indeed, Chief Justice Warren writes that,
“[w]e must consider public education in light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout the
Nation.”204 This statement suggests that Warren was not
merely concerned with the public education context per se, but
also with the interaction between education and other areas
that constituted “American life.” Accordingly, it is not implausible205 to propose that Warren utilized sources such as An
American Dilemma and The Negro in the United States to
make an initial determination about the harmful impact of segregation on the black population in general. Contextualizing
this determination to the case at hand, Warren then found that
the public education context amplified this impact in a manner
that he could not condone.206
Overall, by asking whether such segregation was “a denial
of the equal protection of the laws,”207 Chief Justice Warren did
not use additional legal doctrine above and beyond this language to discipline his engagement with social science sources.
Given his ultimate rejection of the “separate but equal” docBrown, 347 U.S. at 492-93.
I use the term “implausible” here as some will reply that this is an
overstatement because judges inherently know that segregation is wrong and
thus do not need to be presented with evidence displaying the harms that
segregation can cause. See Dworkin, supra note 182, at 5 (asserting that “we
just know” that segregation is wrong). I think that this characterization is
too generous. If judges are inflicted with the same biases that permeate a
majority of the human population, social science may serve to resist those biases in some instances by highlighting how harmful they actually are. Harmful biases do not become any less harmful simply because they are popular.
206 See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (stating that a consideration of the intangible qualities of educational institutions applied with “added force” to lower
education).
207 Id. at 495.
204
205
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trine,208 he could not have used additional doctrine in this fashion. Instead, the unmediated standard of review at play in
Brown gave Chief Justice Warren the necessary discursive flexibility to consult the social science sources that he did while
simultaneously disciplining that flexibility by asking Warren to
use those sources to help define what “equal protection of the
laws”209 might look like in the context of public education.
Had Chief Justice Warren articulated a more exacting
standard of review that relied on language different from the
Constitution itself, it is less clear that sources like Myrdal’s An
American Dilemma and Frazier’s The Negro in the United
States make it into the opinion. Had different language been
articulated, especially language unique to judicial discourse, it
is unclear whether Warren would have given dispositive weight
to precedent in giving content to that language.210 As a result,
the legal rhetoric employed in that precedent could have
caused Warren to look only for non-legal sources that complied
with that rhetoric. If, for example, that rhetoric focused
squarely on the context of public education, it becomes harder
to imagine that lengthy social science sources surveying other
contexts would have been useful in decoding, with specificity,
what the standard of review demanded in the realm of public
education. When, however, Warren applied the broad mandate
of “equal protection of the laws,”211 social science sources had
just as legitimate a claim as precedent in defining what that
language required.
ii. Parents Involved: Social Science Filtered Through the De
Jure/De Facto Construct
A different dynamic seems to be at work as we move to
Parents Involved because, unlike Brown, additional legal doctrine above and beyond the standard of review played a powerful role in filtering the social science sources that made their
Id.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
210 Without footnote eleven, I think Warren could still have comfortably
achieved the desired outcome based on precedent alone. See Brown, 347 U.S.
at 493.
211 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
208
209
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way into the opinion. In order to observe how this dynamic
takes hold in the opinions of Chief Justice Roberts, Justice
Thomas, and Justice Breyer, the argument is divided into two
parts. First, the way that each Justice framed how strict scrutiny should be applied to the facts of the case influenced
whether the Justice used the construct of de jure and de facto
segregation to define the legally relevant racial harm that
could be remedied by the school districts.212 Second, the force
with which each Justice abided by that construct determined
the breadth of the social science literature that the Justice
found relevant to the legal question at hand.213
As previously stated, Chief Justice Roberts applied traditional strict scrutiny analysis by asking whether the school districts could show that their use of racial classifications served a
compelling governmental purpose and was narrowly tailored to
further that purpose.214 In determining what constitutes a
compelling purpose, Chief Justice Roberts notes that, "the
harm being remedied by mandatory desegregation plans is the
harm that is traceable to segregation, and that 'the Constitution is not violated by racial imbalance in the schools, without
more.’”215 Criticizing Justice Breyer’s interpretation of the
compelling purpose prong, Chief Justice Roberts makes his reliance on the distinction between de jure and de facto segregation at this stage of the analysis explicit.216 Indeed, Chief Justice Roberts opines that, “[t]he distinction between segregation
by state action and racial imbalance caused by other factors
has been central to our jurisprudence in this area for generations.”217 The reason that the school districts could not adopt
their plans, in the mind of Chief Justice Roberts, was because
there was no evidence that they were currently subject to state
policies of segregation or contained traces of segregation from
212 For a concise summary of how each justice approached the de jure/de
facto distinction, see Wells, supra note 174, at 1030-31.
213 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 714-15.
214 See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (citing Adarand Constructors Inc., 515 U.S. 200, 227
(1995)).
215 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 721 (quoting Milliken v. Bradley,
433 U.S. 267, 280 n.14 (1977)).
216 See id. at 736.
217 Id.
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previous state policies.218 Thus, from the outset, Chief Justice
Roberts makes clear that he defined the term “compelling purpose” by referencing additional legal doctrine above and beyond
the standard of review.
Due to Chief Justice Roberts’s broader outlook on constitutional theory, it comes as no surprise that he made little mention of social science sources.219 Yet, Chief Justice Roberts
hinted at the types of social science evidence that he might
consider persuasive in a case involving a school district’s desire
to achieve racial diversity.220 After surveying the evidence presented by expert witnesses, he states that the evidence should
be “working forward from some demonstration of the level of
diversity that provides the purported benefits”221 and not aiming to achieve a racial balance.222 This statement provides convincing evidence that Chief Justice Roberts would use the de
jure/de facto construct, a construct that is invoked within the
course of a strict scrutiny analysis, to determine the relevance
of social science sources to the legal question presented.
Paralleling the Chief Justice, Justice Thomas also employed strict scrutiny analysis.223 As in Chief Justice Roberts’s
opinion, the invocation of the term “compelling purpose” generated the presence of additional legal doctrine. To be sure, Justice Thomas cited to his opinion in Grutter v. Bollinger224 to define “compelling purpose” as one that remedies past
discrimination for which the government is responsible.225 At
that moment, Thomas’s reliance on the de jure/de facto construct becomes obvious. To locate this construct within the explicit language of the opinion itself, one need look no further
than Thomas’s statement that the school districts’ plans could
218 See id. at 720; see also Matthew Scutari, Note, “The Great Equalizer”:
Making Sense of the Supreme Court’s Equal Protection Jurisprudence in
American Public Education and Beyond, 97 GEO. L.J. 917, 938 (2009).
219 See Morgan & Pullin, supra note 37, at 521.
220 See id.
221 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 729.
222 See id.
223 See id. at 752 (Thomas, J., concurring).
224 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
225 See Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 771 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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not survive strict scrutiny given that “Seattle has no history of
de jure segregation.”226
While Justice Thomas referenced social science sources to
a greater extent than did the Chief Justice,227 he ultimately relied on the de jure/de facto construct to refine his view of the
social science literature. Given Justice Thomas’s strong language surrounding the type of segregation that would permit
the school districts’ plans to stand under the Constitution, it is
almost certain that Justice Thomas did not, and would not, entertain evidence of de facto segregation.228 In fact, Erica
Frankenberg and Liliana Garces make that exact argument
when they maintain that Justice Thomas’s opinion “allows him
to ignore social science evidence that demonstrates how structural inequalities and governmental policies in non-educational
arenas perpetuate segregation.”229 Overall, for both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, it would be hard to see citations to such voluminous social science sources as An American
Dilemma and The Negro in the United States as a method of
shedding light on the broader social consequences of school segregation. Given their reliance on the de jure/de facto distinction, a distinction made relevant by the “compelling purpose”
language of strict scrutiny analysis, they had already determined that some social consequences could not possibly obtain
legal relevance even before canvassing the social science literature.
In conversation with my analysis of Brown, one might inquire as to what these two Justices would have done with an
unmediated standard of review. Of course, retroactive predictions of judicial decisions are always difficult in construction
and uncertain in application. What I wish to suggest, though,
is that the articulation of an unmediated standard of review
could have changed the Justices’ approach to the social science
literature, even if it would not have changed the outcome of
their opinions. To begin, an unmediated approach would have
asked the Justices to start their analysis by understanding

Id. at 753.
See Morgan & Pullin, supra note 37, at 521.
228 See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 715.
229 Id.
226
227
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what “equal protection of the laws”230 would require in this
case.231 This, obviously enough, would require the Justices to
employ tools of interpretation. In a relatively recent interview,
Chief Justice Roberts gives us a firsthand account of what
types of tools he considers important by stating the following:
“I have a copy of the Constitution on my desk and the first
thing I do when I have a case involving the Constitution is read
what it says. I also have a copy of the Federalist Papers.”232
While I cannot surmise with mathematical precision the weight
he gives to sources like the Federalist Papers, Roberts is clear
that he resorts to interpretive tools beyond the “orthodox legal
materials of text and precedent.”233 Conceding that sources
like the Federalist Papers are appealing to Roberts probably
because of their unique connection to the Constitution, the
structure of Roberts’s thinking is enlightening because it suggests that he uses non-legal sources to inform his interpretation of the constitutional text at a very early stage in his decisionmaking.
It does not seem out of place, then, to suggest that a direct
application of the constitutional text would have caused Roberts, and justices who think like Roberts, to be more rigorous in
using non-legal sources as interpretive tools because there may
be no precedent exactly on point in applying such a broad mandate to novel situations. Arguably, as the standard of review
abstracts to a higher level of rhetorical generality, it becomes
more difficult to apply that generality to the factual nuances of
the case at hand solely in terms of precedent.234 In the absence
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
Recall Siegel’s description of the unmediated approach. See Siegel,
supra note 9, at 2352.
232 The Interview: Chief Justice John G. Roberts, Jr., SCHOLASTIC (Sept.
14, 2006), http://www.scholastic.com/ browse/ article.jsp?id=7479. Justice
Thomas also uses the Federalist Papers to guide his vision of constitutional
interpretation. See Gregory E. Maggs, Which Original Meaning of the Constitution Matters to Justice Thomas, 4 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 494, 509-10 (2009).
233 Posner, supra note 8, at 1179.
234 Richard H. Fallon, Jr. argues that there is a distinction between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” cases in the Supreme Court. On the one hand,
“ordinary” cases involve the direct application of precedent to resolve the controversy. On the other hand, “extraordinary” cases inspire justices to rely on
a guiding principle before applying doctrine. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
230
231
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of a formalized standard of review, the Justices’ decision could
have been supported by a wider breadth of social science
sources than that which was actually cited in order to more efficiently structure the application of more generalized legal
rhetoric (even if their decision had been made by the time of
oral argument).
A wide breadth of social science sources, however, did
make its way into Justice Breyer’s opinion because he took a
unique approach to strict scrutiny that avoided reliance on the
de jure/de facto construct. Although purporting to apply strict
scrutiny in line with the plurality, Justice Breyer seemed to be
influenced by a “contextual approach”235 that appreciates the
distinction between using race to increase diversity and using
race as a form of exclusion.236 In broad strokes, this approach
allowed Justice Breyer to define what a compelling purpose
was by referencing “three essential elements”237 that were
couched in rhetoric that could not be reduced to legal doctrine.
Consider the first element, that of remedying the historical injustice of segregation.238 In the paragraph describing what this
element embodies, one will search in vain to find a single citation to a case or doctrine.239 The other two elements, namely
an educational element and a democratic element, are defined
in much the same way.240 Undeniably, citations to social science sources and the use of non-technical legal language dominated Justice Breyer’s discussion of the “compelling purpose”
prong.
In turn, the “contextual approach” allowed Justice Breyer
Supreme Court 1996 Term—Foreword: Implementing the Constitution, 111
HARV. L. REV. 54, 106-07 (1997). What I am suggesting here is that a move to
an unmediated standard of review may shift a case from an “ordinary” case to
an “extraordinary” one. In turn, this leaves more flexibility for justices to use
non-legal sources in articulating the guiding principle that undergirds application of doctrine.
235 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S.
701, 837 (2007) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
236 See Love, supra note 18, at 133.
237 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 838 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
238 See id.
239 See id.
240 In Justice Breyer’s initial discussion of these three elements (up until
the paragraph that starts, “[m]oreover, this Court from Swann”), I can find
only two citations to Court precedent. See id. at 838-41.
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to declare that, “the distinction between de jure segregation
(caused by school systems) and de facto segregation (caused,
e.g., by housing patterns or generalized societal discrimination)
is meaningless in the present context.”241 The scholarly literature further corroborates Justice Breyer’s disenchantment with
the de jure/de facto distinction.242 By applying the “contextual
approach,” Justice Breyer was able to avoid reliance on this
distinction because the non-technical language that he used to
define the “compelling purpose” prong could be drawn out by
non-legal sources. That is, the use of this construct became
dispensable for Justice Breyer because his application of strict
scrutiny did not rely on rhetoric that had to be given initial
meaning by citing to more legal doctrine. Had Justice Breyer
never mentioned the “contextual approach,” it is less clear that
he would have categorized that distinction as embodying an element of “futility”243 because he might have been forced to deal
more intimately with Justice Thomas’s observation that the
traditional rhetoric of strict scrutiny only allows a school district to voluntarily remedy past discrimination by a governmental unit.244
In light of his strict scrutiny analysis, Justice Breyer took
a holistic approach to the social science evidence245 that did not
rely on the de jure/de facto distinction as a buffer between the
legal question and the social science literature. Instead, Justice Breyer cited empirical data that confirmed the view that
there was a real fear “of a return to school systems that are in
fact (though not in law) resegregated.”246 In stark contrast to
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas, Justice Breyer considered evidence of de facto segregation relevant to the harms

Id. at 806.
See Erica Frankenberg & Chinh Q. Le, The Post-Parents Involved
Challenge: Confronting Extralegal Obstacles to Integration, 69 OHIO ST. L.J.
1015, 1024 (2008); Wells, supra note 174, at 1031; see also Comment, Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1: Voluntary
Racial Integration in Public Schools, 121 HARV. L. REV. 98, 102 (2007).
243 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 820 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
244 See id. at 754 (Thomas, J., concurring).
245 See Morgan & Pullin, supra note 37, at 521.
246 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 806 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
241
242
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that the school districts could remedy.247 As should come as no
surprise, what helps to explain this difference, I think, is Justice Breyer’s “contextual approach” to strict scrutiny. As I have
aimed to show, this approach provided him with discretion to
consult certain social science material that otherwise might
have remained ignored had he relied more heavily on technical
vocabulary in applying the “compelling purpose” prong. To
come full circle in this case study, then, the “contextual approach” to strict scrutiny did for Justice Breyer indirectly what
the unmediated standard of review did for Chief Justice Warren directly in terms of generating discursive flexibility for
dealing with social science sources. Viewed in this way, Justice
Breyer’s dissent had a majority all along.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a famous dissent, Holmes writes that our Constitution
is “an experiment, as all life is an experiment.”248 At its heart,
that is precisely what this article is. This article has experimented with the possibility that the enunciation of technical
legal vocabulary in the standard of review constrains judicial
consideration of social science sources. If this article proves to
be successful, it will provide the Hamiltonians with further
ammunition to duel249 with the Posner’s of the world.
As should be apparent, this article is greatly limited in
scope. This article serves as an initial talking point and nothing more. If this hypothesis is worth pursuing in the future, I
respectfully call upon scholars (who inevitably will have more
time, resources, and brain power than I) to help me corroborate
it in a more comprehensive fashion. Within the context of
school desegregation cases alone, this article needs to be supported by an analysis of how other opinions have dealt with social science evidence in light of the precise articulation of the
standard of review.250 Further, if this article’s hypothesis is to
See Frankenberg & Garces, supra note 19, at 714.
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
249 Unfortunately, Alexander Hamilton was killed during a duel with Aaron Burr in 1804. See THOMAS FLEMING, DUEL: ALEXANDER HAMILTON, AARON
BURR AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICA (1999).
250 Professor Heise has investigated the Supreme Court’s treatment of
247
248
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encompass classifications beyond that of race, analysis will
need to be done that investigates how both rational basis review and intermediate scrutiny constrain, or enable, a court’s
ability to engage with social science sources. If, however, this
hypothesis is not worth pursuing for whatever reason, I seek
refuge in the words of Herbert Wechsler: “Those of us to whom
it is not given to ‘live greatly in the law’ are surely called upon
to fail in the attempt.”251

social science sources in the Grutter and Parents Involved opinions. See Michael Heise, Judicial Decision-Making, Social Science Evidence, and Equal
Educational Opportunity: Uneasy Relations and Uncertain Futures, 31
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 863 (2008). Perhaps this article can steer such an analysis in a new direction.
251 Wechsler, supra note 26, at 35 (quoting Holmes).

